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May 6, 2010 
Abstract 
This paper examines if the probability of leaving unemployment changes for unem-
ployed parents with young children when childcare is available. To investigate this, I 
use the heterogeneity among Swedish municipalities before the implementation of a 
2001 Swedish childcare reform making it mandatory for municipalities to offer child-
care to unemployed parents for at least 15 hours per week. In the study difference-in-
differences and difference-in-difference-in-differences methods are used. The results 
indicate a positive effect on the probability of leaving unemployment for mothers when 
childcare is available, but no effect is found for fathers. For mothers, some heterogene-
ous effects are also found, with a greater effect on the probability of leaving unemploy-
ment for work when childcare is available for mothers with only compulsory schooling 
or university education and mothers with two children. 
Keywords: Unemployment duration, childcare 
JEL-codes: J13, J64 
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2  IFAU – Does providing childcare to unemployed affect unemployment duration? 1 Introduction 
This paper evaluates whether making childcare available for unemployed parents affects 
their probability of finding work. In Sweden subsidized childcare is available for all 
families with young children when both parents work. A reform implemented in July 
2001 forced Swedish municipalities to also offer childcare to unemployed parents for at 
least 15 hours per week. The reform was mainly motivated for child investment reasons, 
but an additional aim with the reform was to make it easier for unemployed parents to 
search and find work. It is therefore interesting to see if the reform affected the parents' 
probability to start working. 
According to search theory, an unemployed individual may influence his or her 
probability of receiving a job offer through the intensity and time that the individual de-
votes to searching for work. An unemployed individual will accept a job offer if the 
wage is equal to or larger than the individual's reservation wage (for a review of search 
theory, see Mortensen 1987).  
Offering childcare to unemployed parents may change both their search intensity and 
reservation wage and therefore the probability of leaving unemployment for work. For 
an unemployed parent with a young child, two obstacles to leaving unemployment exist 
when there is no childcare available for them. The first is finding time to search for a 
job while caring for the child. The second is finding temporary childcare after being of-
fered a job until the child can be put in regular childcare. Although all working parents 
in Sweden are offered childcare, there is usually some waiting time before a parent en-
tering the workforce can find a childcare placement for his or her child
1. When unem-
ployed parents are offered childcare, these obstacles are reduced, and the duration of 
unemployment might decrease.  
There may, however, be an opposite effect if an unemployed parent is offered child-
care. If the unemployed parent appreciates time at home without the child, this extra lei-
sure time increases the parent's utility and then decreases his or her willingness to start 
working, or increases the parent's reservation wage, which might increase the duration 
IFAU – Does providing childcare to unemployed affect unemployment duration?  3 of unemployment. Thus, childcare for unemployed parents makes it possible for the 
parent to increase his or her search intensity, but it may also increase the parent's reser-
vation wage. The net effect is therefore an empirical question. 
This paper is related to two strands of the literature. The first is search theory and 
determinants of unemployment duration. Empirically, both labor market conditions and 
individual characteristics have been evaluated (see, for example, Røed and Zhang 2003, 
Arulampalam 2001 and Carroll 2006, who evaluate the effects of unemployment insur-
ance, scarring from earlier unemployment spells and individual characteristics on un-
employment duration). The second is the literature on the effect of subsidized childcare 
on the female labor supply in particular (for a survey, see Anderson and Levine 2002). 
Both lack of childcare availability and the cost of childcare are barriers to employment, 
especially for low-income families (Kisker and Ross 1997). What differs in this study is 
that the parents have already decided to enter the labor force, and childcare is always 
available for parents leaving unemployment. In this paper, I join the two strands of lit-
erature by evaluating how availability of childcare during unemployment affects unem-
ployment duration. To my knowledge, this has not been done before. 
Before the reform, implemented in July 2001, a majority of the municipalities of-
fered childcare to unemployed parents. This heterogeneity permits the use of a differ-
ence-in-differences (DD) approach to evaluate the effects of childcare availability on 
the probability of leaving unemployment. As the childcare reform did not affect parents 
whose youngest child was old enough to be in preschool class
2 or primary school, these 
parents can be used as a control group in the estimation, making it possible to also use a 
difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) strategy. To include all unemployed par-
ents, not just those leaving unemployment for work, the DD (and DDD) strategy  will 
be applied to a proportional hazard model (see section  3.3) to determine how the 
                                                                                                                                               
1 In the majority of the municipalities, most parents who apply for childcare in May are offered a placement in 
September, when older children leave childcare for preschool. At other times of the year, some municipalities find it 
harder to offer childcare. 
2 Preschool class, compared to childcare, is more similar to primary school, but it is not compulsory; see section 2.1. 
4  IFAU – Does providing childcare to unemployed affect unemployment duration? probability of finding work (hazard rate) changes for unemployed parents when child-
care is available
3. 
In the DD estimation, two different control groups are used: parents with young chil-
dren in control municipalities and parents in treatment municipalities whose youngest 
children are old enough to be enrolled in preschool class or primary school. Both con-
trol groups are used in the DDD estimation. In the first DD estimation, using parents in 
other municipalities as the control, positive and significant effects of childcare avail-
ability on the probability of finding work are found for mothers with young children. 
Unfortunately, positive effects are also found in placebo estimations, but the point esti-
mates are smaller. When the second control group is used, the sample size decreases, 
and all estimates are insignificant. When controlling for several individual characteris-
tics and time effects in the DDD estimation, I find that the probability of leaving unem-
ployment increases by 17 percent for mothers when childcare is available, significant at 
the 5 percent level. For fathers with young children, no effects are found in any of the 
estimations. 
For mothers, some heterogeneous effects are also found. Mothers with only compul-
sory school or any university education had a higher probability of finding work when 
childcare was available, while no effect could be found for those mothers with a high 
school education of two years or less. Likewise, no effect could be found for mothers 
with only one child, while mothers with two children had a 35 percent higher probabil-
ity of finding work when childcare was available during unemployment. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 summarizes family poli-
cies in Sweden, particularly the Swedish childcare reform; in section 3, the econometric 
method is described; and section 4 presents the data. The results are discussed in section 
5 before concluding in section 6. 
                                                 
3 The same strategy is used by Clotfelter et al. (2008), using a policy intervention in North Carolina to evaluate 
whether higher salaries keep teachers in high-poverty schools. 
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Sweden 
2.1  Family policies in Sweden 
Sweden has very generous family policies compared to other European countries. At the 
time for this study there were paid parental leave for 390 days
4, pay for care of sick 
children, cash support and subsidized childcare (for an overview, see Björklund 2006). 
Both mothers and fathers utilize the paid parental leave, but most parents then return to 
their employment. In 2001, 43.3 percent of all one-year-old children and 79.3 percent of 
all two-year-old children in Sweden were in childcare (Swedish National Agency for 
Education 2002). The municipalities are responsible for ensuring that childcare is avail-
able for those parents that are entitled to childcare according to the law, and the fees are 
largely subsidized. The municipalities may make agreements with other parties to pro-
vide the actual childcare services (SFS 1985). To guarantee high-quality childcare, a 
preschool curriculum including goals and guidelines for the activities offered in child-
care was created in Sweden in 1998 (Swedish National Agency for Education 1998). 
In Sweden, municipalities must provide free preschool classes beginning in the au-
tumn of the year in which the child turns six years old. One year later, the child starts 
compulsory school. In the 2001-2002 school year, 93 percent of all six-year-old chil-
dren in Sweden attended a preschool class (Swedish National Agency for Education 
2002). 
2.2  The childcare reform 
The Swedish childcare reform implemented between July 2001 and January 2003 con-
sists of four parts. Offering childcare to unemployed parents, the part of the reform in-
vestigated in this study, was the first to be implemented, in July 2001. Both the second 
and third parts were introduced in January 2002. The second part made it mandatory for 
municipalities to offer childcare for at least 15 hours each week, for children whose par-
ents are on parental leave with a younger sibling. The third part introduced a cap on 
childcare prices, leading to a considerable reduction in childcare costs (for an evaluation 
6  IFAU – Does providing childcare to unemployed affect unemployment duration? of this part, see Lundin et al. 2008). This part was not mandatory for the municipalities, 
but those that introduced the cap were offered extra grants by the central government.  
The fourth part, implemented in January 2003, was the introduction of universal free 
childcare for all four- and five-year-old children for at least 525 hours per year (Swedish 
National Agency for Education 2007}). The part of the reform used in this study was 
implemented mainly to prevent isolation of the children of unemployed parents and to 
increase their opportunity to meet other children and take part in childcare activities, but 
the government also thought that the reform would allow unemployed parents to search 
for work more effectively (Swedish National Agency for Education 1999). 
During the spring of 1998 and the spring of 2001, the Swedish National Agency for 
Education conducted surveys to see in which municipalities unemployed parents were 
offered childcare. Two questions were asked: first, could parents who already had a 
childcare placement keep the child in childcare if they became unemployed, and second, 
would childcare be available for unemployed parents where the child had not been in 
childcare before?  
In the analysis, the municipalities are grouped according to their responses to the first 
question. For some parents in the control group, the variable indicating that childcare is 
available will then be wrong, indicating that childcare is available when it is not. Be-
cause this categorization will put some parents who should be in the treatment group in 
the control group, the effect of childcare availability will be underestimated
5. 
The municipalities can then be divided into three different groups according to their 
responses to the surveys. The first group consists of those municipalities that did not of-
fer unemployed parents any childcare. This is the clean treatment group of municipali-
ties in the estimations. The second group consists of those municipalities where unem-
ployed parents could keep their childcare placement, but only for a limited number of 
months (ranging from 2 to 12 months). Parents in this group of municipalities will be-
long to either the control or treatment group depending on how long they have been un-
                                                                                                                                               
4 In January 2002, this was extended to 480days. 
5 This problem will be minimized by only including those parents with unemployment insurance because to be 
eligible for UI, the parent must have been employed previously and would thus have had childcare available; see 
section 4. 
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6. In the third group of 
municipalities, unemployed parents could keep their childcare placement with no re-
strictions in months even before the reform. Therefore, the reform introduced no 
change, and these municipalities are used as the control group. A total of 208 munici-
palities were classified into these three groups, and the number of municipalities in each 
group is shown in Table 1. The remaining 81 Swedish municipalities did not respond to 
one or both surveys or changed their policies. Because it is not possible to know when 
they changed their policies, they are removed from the analysis. 
Table 1 Municipality groups 
Municipalities where:   
1. Clean treatment group  14 
(Childcare was not available for unemployed parents before the reform)   
2. Treatment and control  43 
(Childcare was available for a limited number of months before the reform)   
3. Clean control group  151 
(Childcare was available with no time limits before the reform)   
 
The control municipalities also offered different amount of hours in childcare to un-
employed parents ranging between 3 hours per week to no time restriction There were 
however only 9 control municipalities offering less than 15 hours of childcare per week 
before the reform. In the analysis I only take into account if childcare is available for 
any hours since the parent then have at least some time to search for work and if offer-
ing a job the child has a childcare placement.  
Since the municipalities are responsible for providing subsidized childcare, and also 
do it to a very large extent, there are few alternative childcare services in Sweden. The 
implication is that for those families where publicly provided childcare was not availa-
ble before the reform there existed basically no other alternatives; if the parent became 
unemployed, the child had to leave childcare. 
In Table 2, descriptive statistics (means) for the different municipality groups are 
shown for the year 2000. As can be seen, the unemployment rate is higher in the treat-
ment municipalities, and these municipalities also have smaller populations on average. 
                                                 
6 Because a proportional hazard model is used, variables may change in the estimation; therefore, it is possible for 
parents in these municipalities to change from control status to treatment status. See section 3.3. 
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three groups, while the share of immigrants is slightly smaller in those municipalities 
that, before the reform, only offered childcare to unemployed parents for a limited num-
ber of months. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics (means) of municipality groups (2000) 
 Treatment  Limited  Control 
Unemployment  (%)  4.952 3.994 4.144 
Population  18 566  20 145  35 607 
Children age 2–6  0.054  0.054  0.055 
Immigrants  0.106 0.087 0.107 
Women  0.500 0.498 0.500 
N 14  43  151 
 
The reform had a positive effect on the rate of participation in childcare among child-
ren of unemployed parents. The share of children of unemployed parents in childcare 
increased from 65 percent in 1999 to 82 percent in 2002, when the reform was imple-
mented (Swedish National Agency for Education 2003). As the unemployment rate de-
creased during the same period of time, the total number of children of unemployed 
parents in childcare was unchanged, but the changes are heterogeneous across the 
groups of municipalities. 
Unfortunately, the childcare reform was not the only reform implemented on July 1, 
2001, that may have had an effect on unemployed parents' probability of entering the 
workforce. On the same date, the first part of an unemployment insurance reform that 
introduced a new two-tiered benefit structure for some individuals and raised the benefit 
level was implemented. Bennmarker et al. (2007) used this reform to evaluate whether 
the higher benefits increased the unemployment duration. They found, consistent with 
theory, that unemployment durations increased for men, but for women, the unemploy-
ment duration decreased. They mentioned the Swedish childcare reform as a plausible 
explanation for the difference between men and women. This UI reform affected those 
with higher earlier earnings more, and although I am not able to control for earlier 
earnings, heterogeneous effects over education could be expected if this reform had a 
differential effect on individuals with higher earlier wages. Education level is included 
as a control variable in the estimations, but I also divide the sample according to educa-
tion to search for heterogeneous effects; see section 5.3. 
IFAU – Does providing childcare to unemployed affect unemployment duration?  9 3 Econometric  method 
3.1 Difference-in-differences 
In difference-in-differences (DD), the identifying assumption is that there are parallel 
trends between the treatment group and the control group. If this assumption is fulfilled, 
the estimation gives the treatment effect of the treated. In this case, the treatment group 
consists of those parents with children aged between two and six years living in munici-
palities that did not offer any childcare to unemployed parents before the reform. It is 
then possible to use two different control groups. The first consists of parents with chil-
dren of the same age living in municipalities where childcare was available for unem-
ployed parents before the reform, that is, the control municipalities. The second consists 
of unemployed parents whose youngest child is aged between six
7 and ten years living 
in the same municipalities as the treatment group. These parents with older youngest 
children were not affected by the childcare reform because their children attend school 
every day, giving them time to search for jobs. In summary, the treatment group con-
sists of target parents living in treatment municipalities, the first control group consists 
of target parents living in control municipalities, and the second control group consists 
of non-target parents living in treatment municipalities. 
The first DD estimation with control municipalities is then given by: 
  12 3 xα
mtm t Z ZZ Z α αα ′ =++  (1) 
where 
m Z  equals one if the municipality did not offer childcare to unemployed parents 
before the reform and
t  Z  equals one after the reform dat 3 e. α  is the DD parameter 
estimating the effect of childcare availability on the probability for the target parents in 
the treatment municipalities to start working. The second DD estimation, using non-
target parents as the control group, is given by: 
t   123 xλ
ata Z ZZ Z λ λλ ′ =++  (2) 
                                                 
7 If the child is six years old, he or she will be in childcare during the spring and begin preschool class in August.  
Unemployed parents with six-year-old children will then be in the target group until July, and from August onward 
they will be in the non-target group. 
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a Z  equals one if the parent belongs to the target group (that is, if the parent's 
youngest child is between two and six years old) and  3 λ  is the DD parameter. 
To obtain an unbiased estimator in equation 1, the assumption is that the trends are 
equal for unemployed parents with young children in the different municipalities. For 
equation 2 to give an unbiased estimator, the trend has to be equal for parents with chil-
dren of different ages within the municipalities. Estimations are performed with both 
control groups, both with and without additional covariates, to control for differences in 
the groups and thereby increase the efficiency of the estimation. 
In ordinary DD estimation, the control group is untreated, but in this case, the control 
group is treated all the time (as with parents in the control municipalities, equation 1) or 
can be seen as treated all the time (as with parents with older youngest children, equa-
tion 2). Instead of the interaction term, I will therefore use a dummy,  , that 
equals one if childcare (or school for parents with older children) is available for the un-
employed parent. In the first DD estimation, in which the control group consists of tar-
get parents in the control municipalities, even those parents living in municipalities that 
only offered childcare for a limited number of months will be included. Because the co-
variates are allowed to vary in the hazard model, a parent who was unemployed for 
more months than childcare was available before the reform will first have childcare 
( ) and then lose it (
() mat CC
1 mt CC = 0 mt CC = ). To control for any difference between these 
municipalities and the others, an additional dummy variable for municipality, 
2 m Z , that 
equals one if the parent was living in one of the municipalities only offering childcare 
for a limited number of months before the reform is included. In the estimation with ad-




12 3 4 5 () () xα St Wi γδ
mmt
mt mt ZZZ C C u α αα α α ′ =++ + + ++  (3) 
where   is local unemployment,   captures seasonal effects and   controls 
for individual characteristics. In the DD estimation when parents with older youngest 
mt u () St () Wi
                                                 
8 
1 1
m Z =  for those municipalities that did not offer any childcare before the reform, and 
2 1
m Z =  for those 
municipalities offering childcare for a limited number of months. Both are otherwise equal to zero. 
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the reform are included, and the estimation with additional covariates is: 
  123 4 () () λ x
at
at mt ZZC Cu γ δ S t W i λ λλ λ ′ = ++ ++ +  (4) 
Because there is one additional dimension to compare over, it is possible to run pla-
cebo estimations. The placebo estimation for equation 3 will be run with only non-target 
parents with older youngest children. The parents living in treatment municipalities 
where childcare were not available before the reform will, in this placebo estimation, 
have   before the reform date and  0 mt CC = 1 mt CC =  after. The placebo estimation for 
equation 4 uses the control municipalities where childcare was available for unem-
ployed parents before the reform, but parents with younger children will have 
 before the reform date.  0 at = CC
If  4 α  and  3 λ  are close to zero in the placebo regressions this indicates that the 
assumptions are realistic.  If this is not the case in any of the estimations, there may be 
both municipality trends and trends within groups of parents with the youngest child of 
different ages. To control for both of these trends, difference-in-difference-in-differ-
ences (DDD) estimation can be used. 
3.2 Difference-in-difference-in-differences 
In a basic DDD-estimation,   is given by:  β x′
  123 4 5 6 7 β x
matm am ta tm a t Z Z Z ZZ ZZ ZZ ZZZ β βββ β β β ′ =+++ + + +  (5) 
where 
m Z  indicates if a municipality did not offer childcare before the reform, 
a Z indicates if the parent belongs to the target group with the youngest child between 
two and six years old and 
t Z  indicates time after the reform.  7 β  gives the effect of 
childcare because 
mat Z ZZ measures the difference in availability of childcare for the 
target group in the treatment municipalities. As in the DD estimation, I use , 
which equals one if childcare (or school) is available instead of 
mat CC
mat Z ZZ.  The differ-
ence for the target group in the treatment municipalities when childcare is available will 
still be measured by  7 β , as can be seen in Table 3. 
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Treatment municipality 
1
m Z =  
After  1
t Z =   Before  0
t Z =   Diff: After-Before  
Target  1















Non target    0
a Z =
1357 ββββ +++  17 β β +  
35 β β +  
DDT      67    β β +  
Control municipality 
0
m Z =  
After  1
t Z =   Before  0
t Z =   Diff: After-Before  
Target  1
a Z =  
36       
7 ββββ +++  
27 β β +   36 ββ +  
Non target    0
a Z =
37 ββ +  
7 β    3 β  
DDC      6 β  
DDD=DDT−DDC      7 β  
 
As in the first DD estimation, apart from the change of the DDD variable to   
in equation 5, I include an additional variable for those municipalities offering childcare 
for a limited number of months before the reform, 
mat CC
2 m Z , in addition to interactions of 
this variable with 
a Z  and 
t Z . I also include  ,   and   to control for local 
unemployment, seasonal effects and individual characteristics. 
mt u () St () Wi
The full model to be estimated will be: 
 
12 1 2
12 3 4 5 6 7 xβ
mma t m a m a m 1 t Z ZZ Z Z Z Z Z Z Z β ββ β β β β ′ =++ + + + +  (6) 
 
2
89 1 0 1 1 () () St W δ i γ
mt a t
mat mt ZZ Z Z C C u β ββ β ++ ++ + +  
In both the DD and the DDD estimations, the standard errors are clustered on munici-
palities. 
Because childcare has traditionally been performed by mothers, the availability of 
childcare to unemployed parents may affect mothers and fathers differently. Therefore, 
the estimations will be done separately for men and women. 
3.3  Proportional hazard model 
To estimate how the availability of childcare affects the probability of becoming em-
ployed for unemployed parents with younger children, the DD and DDD estimations are 
applied to a proportional hazard model (Cox 1972). In this model, the conditional haz-
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rate functions according to: 
  0 (| ,) ()(,) β x β tt x λ λφ =  (7) 
where  0() t λ  is the baseline hazard capturing any state dependence and  (,) x β φ  is a 
function of  . Only the current value of   matters, not the entire history of  , 
but   is allowed to vary over the unemployment spell. The model is semiparametric, 
where the baseline hazard is unspecified and the functional form of 
() t x
() t
() x t () t x
(,) x β
x
φ  is fully 
specified as: 
  (,) e x p ( ) x β x β φ ′ =  (8) 
The  -vector is found by partial likelihood estimation, and the baseline hazard drops 
out in the estimation but may be estimated in a second step. This second step is not done 
in this study because the interest here is the effect of availability of childcare and not 
whether there is any state dependence. The results will be interpreted as hazard ratios, 
β
( i exp ) β . If  i x  changes by one unit, the probability of leaving unemployment will 
change by 1e x p () i β − . 
The strength of this model is that it is possible to include time-varying covariates and 
handle right-censored data; i.e., a parent whose unemployment spell ends in an outcome 
other than employment can still be included in the analysis.
9. 
4 Data 
The data set used in this study includes register data of all individuals in Sweden to-
gether with all unemployment spells registered at the labor market office in Sweden. 
The propensity to register at the labor market office is very high among unemployed in-
dividuals because registration is required to receive unemployment benefits. 
                                                 
9 The problem is whether there is unobserved heterogeneity, which causes a selection problem. If this is the case, β  
is probably underestimated, but the asymptotic bias is towards zero; see Van den Berg (2001). 
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two and ten years old, who registered at the labor market office between July 2000 and 
June 2002 and lived in one of the 208 municipalities where it is possible to classify the 
availability of childcare before the reform
10. As mentioned in section 2.2, municipalities 
could offer childcare to unemployed parents differently according to whether or not they 
already had a childcare placement for their child. To minimize the risk of parents being 
miscategorized as having childcare in the control municipalities when they did not, only 
those parents with unemployment insurance are included because an unemployed indi-
vidual must have some employment history to be eligible for unemployment insurance. 
Of the mothers in the sample, 83 percent have UI, and for fathers, the number is 88 per-
cent. All spells are censored at the reform date, July 1st, 2001 (or, for spells beginning 
after the reform date, one year later) because it is very unlikely that the municipalities 
that did not offer childcare before the reform would be able to provide childcare to all 
unemployed parents immediately at the reform date. 
The time span was chosen to be as close as possible in time to the reform date, but 
still long enough to control for seasonal effects. Because parents are entitled to paid pa-
rental leave for more than a year (390 days at the time of the reform), parents with 
youngest children older than two years old are used to minimize cases in which an un-
employed parent has a spouse on parental leave taking care of the child. Because it is 
unclear whether childcare is available for unemployed parents participating in labor 
market programs, these parents' unemployment spells are censored when they partici-
pate in any form of program. Also, if a parent's employment is subsidized by the gov-
ernment, the spell is censored. If a parent has temporary work for ten days or less, this is 
included in the unemployment spell. 
To control for individual heterogeneity, I use a large number of covariates, including 
5 dummies for education level, 20 dummies for regions, age and age squared, and 
dummies for being an immigrant, a disabled worker and being married. Seasonal effects 
are captured by 11 time-varying dummies for month. As all spells are censored on July 
1st, a control variable for entering month will also be included to control for the fact 
                                                 
10 See Table 1, section 2.2. 
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the parent became unemployed. Local labor market conditions are captured by time-
varying municipal unemployment rates. Sample characteristics and the reasons for 
ending the unemployment spells are shown in Table 4 and Table 6 for target parents and 
Table 5 and Table 7 for non-target parents. In these tables, parents are divided into 
groups according to the municipalities in which they live and whether their 
unemployment spell began before or after the reform date. In the estimation, only 
ordinary work implies leaving unemployment; the remaining destinations are censored. 
Table 4 shows that, for target mothers in the treatment municipalities, the mean 
unemployment duration is approximately the same after the reform compared with be-
fore, while in the other municipality groups, the mean duration increased. There are also 
more target mothers in the treatment municipalities whose unemployment spells ended 
in work after the reform. As seen in Table 5, this is not the case for the non-target moth-
ers, where no particular change can be seen in spells that end in work. The mean dura-
tion increases for the non-target mothers living in the treatment municipalities, but even 
more for the non-target mothers in the control municipalities. For the non-target moth-
ers living in municipalities only offering childcare for a limited number of months, the 
mean duration decreases. For the target fathers in the treatment municipalities, the mean 
unemployment duration decreased 5, but it decreased even more for the non-target fa-
thers in the same municipalities. It is also notable in these tables (Table 4–Table 7) that, 
even though the total shares of immigrants were similar in the treatment and control 
municipalities (see Table 2), the share of unemployed immigrant parents was lower in 
the treatment municipalities compared with the other municipalities. 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics - target women 
  Before reform  After reform 
Municipality Treatment  Limited  Control Treatment  Limited  Control 
Duration(Days) 55.0  57.2 56.6 55.1  60.8  61.4 
Age 32.5  32.5  32.8  32.4  32.8  33.1 
Immigrants 0.142  0.255  0.247 0.159  0.258  0.254 
Married 0.437  0.464  0.458 0.439  0.468  0.469 
Elementary school <9 years  0.015 0.024 0.019  0.013  0.024  0.019 
Elementary school  0.115  0.114 0.125 0.126  0.119  0.121 
High school ≤ 2 years  0.371  0.366  0.354 0.355  0.332  0.327 
High school ≤ 3 years  0.279  0.281  0.257 0.278  0.289  0.269 
University < 3 years  0.150  0.146 0.146 0.167  0.149  0.154 
University ≥ 3  years  0.070  0.067  0.095 0.059  0.084  0.108 
Number of spells  1 378  3 800  21 245  1 277  3 650  21 244 
Percent of spells ending in:             
Work 32.37  32.74  33.54 36.81  33.89  33.75 
Subsidized work  1.45  0.87 0.93 1.10  0.82  1.07 
Labor market program  13.43  12.16 10.11 14.41  11.70  11.52 
Other destination  5.37  5.37 6.81 8.46  7.07  8.23 
Studies 7.62  7.84  8.05 6.50  6.82  7.23 
Censored due to time  39.77  41.03 40.56 32.73  39.70  38.19 
 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics - non-target women 
  Before reform  After reform 
Municipality Treatment  Limited  Control Treatment  Limited  Control 
Duration(Days) 60.4  67.9 60.4 61.1  63.4  67.1 
Age 36.7  37.1  37.3  37.1  37.1  37.6 
Immigrants 0.157  0.283  0.251 0.196  0.297  0.268 
Married 0.485  0.510  0.460 0.468  0.476  0.462 
Elementary school <9 years  0.017 0.023 0.026  0.019  0.027  0.026 
Elementary school  0.111  0.135 0.119 0.113  0.114  0.117 
High school ≤ 2 years  0.409  0.364  0.384 0.392  0.359  0.361 
High school ≤ 3 years  0.208  0.236  0.202 0.222  0.240  0.211 
University < 3 years  0.151  0.151 0.158 0.152  0.150  0.160 
University ≥ 3  years  0.104  0.089  0.108 0.096  0.107  0.122 
Number of spells  952  2 448  12 877  893  2 370  13 027 
Percent of spells ending in:             
Work 37.18  35.38  35.43 37.40  35.27  35.81 
Subsidized work  1.89  1.35 1.12 1.79  1.60  1.42 
Labor market program  15.97  11.60 11.70 14.89  13.12  12.24 
Other destination  4.52  6.17 6.11 8.96  6.92  7.58 
Studies 6.62  6.33  7.95 5.15  8.23  7.37 
Censored due to time  33.82  39.17 37.70 31.80  34.85  35.59 
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics - target men 
  Before reform  After reform 
Municipality Treatment  Limited  Control Treatment  Limited  Control 
Duration(Days) 72.5  68.6 68.5 70.5  72.4  74.7 
Age 35.0  36.3  36.1  35.4  36.4  36.3 
Immigrants 0.168  0.316  0.295 0.164  0.328  0.294 
Married 0.455  0.582  0.551 0.481  0.552  0.565 
Elementary school <9 years  0.016 0.030 0.024  0.018  0.028  0.024 
Elementary school  0.102  0.141 0.134 0.099  0.132  0.131 
High school ≤ 2 years  0.629  0.480  0.465 0.586  0.460  0.429 
High school ≤ 3 years  0.156  0.162  0.156 0.161  0.169  0.155 
University < 3 years  0.060  0.104 0.120 0.079  0.118  0.136 
University ≥ 3  years  0.034  0.080  0.094 0.057  0.092  0.121 
Number of spells  685  1 950  9 759  669  1 863  10 200 
Percent of spells ending in:             
Work 50.95  41.23  44.73 46.79  40.74  42.53 
Subsidized work  2.34  2.00 2.38 1.94  2.47  2.18 
Labor market program  13.87  13.23 11.24 16.44  13.26  12.35 
Other destination  6.42  5.28 6.89 7.62  6.92  7.63 
Studies 3.21  3.28  3.87 2.84  3.60  3.28 
Censored due to time  23.21  34.97 30.89 24.36  33.01  32.03 
 
Table 7 Descriptive statistics – non-target men 
  Before reform  After reform 
Municipality Treatment  Limited  Control Treatment  Limited  Control 
Duration(Days) 78.4  73.9 75.6 72.7  79.1  82.9 
Age 40.4  40.7  40.9  40.5  40.9  41.0 
Immigrants 0.163  0.254  0.235 0.167  0.271  0.253 
Married 0.604  0.621  0.620 0.620  0.640  0.606 
Elementary school <9 years  0.024 0.034 0.035  0.019  0.041  0.034 
Elementary school  0.165  0.158 0.156 0.154  0.155  0.139 
High school ≤ 2 years  0.578  0.515  0.495 0.582  0.474  0.481 
High school ≤ 3 years  0.124  0.121  0.125 0.103  0.155  0.129 
University < 3 years  0.075  0.095 0.095 0.099  0.099  0.108 
University ≥ 3  years  0.034  0.074  0.088 0.044  0.073  0.106 
Number of spells  533  1 334  6 655  526  1 271  6 905 
Percent of spells ending in:             
Work 53.28  45.95  48.82 53.99  46.50  46.27 
Subsidized work  2.06  2.92 2.67 1.90  2.52  3.20 
Labor market program  12.76  13.19 11.93 16.54  11.72  12.06 
Other destination  6.38  6.52 6.31 7.60  8.34  7.01 
Studies 3.19  3.15  3.01 1.14  2.52  2.72 
Censored due to time  22.33  28.26 27.26 18.82  28.40  28.73 
 
18  IFAU – Does providing childcare to unemployed affect unemployment duration? Figure 1 shows the fraction of unemployed mothers with young children, leaving un-
employment for work in a specific month out of those who were unemployed at the be-
ginning of that month. The solid line represent those municipalities where no childcare 
was available before the reform (treatment municipalities), and the dashed line 
represents those municipalities where childcare was available without any time restric-
tion before the reform (control municipalities). Mothers living in one of the municipali-
ties only offering childcare for a limited number of months before the reform are not in-
cluded in the figure
11. The vertical line indicates July 2001, when the reform was imple-
mented. It is hard to see any clear change after the reform, but beginning in October 
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Figure 1 Raw hazard rates, target mothers, July 2000 to June 2002 
If there are municipality-specific reasons other than the availability of childcare 
causing the difference in the proportions of mothers finding work, we would also see 
this effect for mothers with older children, as shown in Figure 2. Even here, the propor- 
                                                 
11 These mothers will be included in the first DD estimation and the DDD estimation, where the treatment status may 
change. 
IFAU – Does providing childcare to unemployed affect unemployment duration?  19 tion of mothers finding work is higher at the end of the period, but the effect seems 
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Figure 2 Raw hazard rates, non-target mothers, July 2000 to June 2002 
The same figures for fathers are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. In line with the de-
scriptive statistics in Table 6 and Table 7 , there is a clearer increase in leaving 
unemployment for the non-target fathers in the treatment municipalities after the reform 
than for the target fathers. 
From the descriptive statistics and these figures, it appears that there are effects on 
the probability of finding work for mothers, but not for fathers, when childcare is avail-
able for unemployed parents. Because there are similar effects for parents with older 
youngest children (non-target group), it is very important to control for municipality 
characteristics, which is done by including the monthly local unemployment rates, pop-
ulation and share of children aged 2–6 years. 
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Figure 4 Raw hazard rates, non-target fathers, July 2000 to June 2002 
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5.1 Difference-in-differences 
Estimation results of the effects of childcare availability from the first DD estimation, 
with parents living in municipalities where childcare was available before the reform as 
the control group, are given in the first row of Table 8. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses and p-values in brackets. For both mothers and fathers, the estimates are 
greater than zero in all estimations, but it is only for mothers that the estimates are sig-
nificantly different from zero. Because the estimates increase when additional covari-
ates are included in the full model and therefore some unobserved heterogeneity is taken 
away, more unobserved heterogeneity will probably increase the estimates even more. 
The estimated effect is large, with an increased probability of finding work of 21 per-
cent for mothers if childcare is available when the parent is unemployed. 
Table 8 Estimation results for childcare, DD over municipalities 
   Mothers  Fathers 
 basic  full  basic  full 
Target Group  0.159  0.189 0.040  0.080 
 (0.076)  (0.068)  (0.071)  (0.062) 
 [0.036]  [0.006]  [0.578]  [0.197] 
N  52 594  52 594  25 126  25 126 
Placebo Estimation         
Non Target group  0.083 0.143  0.121  0.156 
 (0.084)  (0.076)  (0.090)  (0.072) 
 [0.318]  [0.060]  [0.179]  [0.029] 
N  32 567  32 567  17 224  17 224 
Standard errors clustered on municipality in parentheses, P-values in brackets. 
 
The problem is that there are probably reasons other than childcare that are captured 
by the childcare variable because there are estimates greater than zero even in the pla-
cebo estimations (second part of Table 8), where parents with older children are com-
pared, and no effect would be found if the assumption for this DD estimation were ful-
filled. In the basic estimation with no additional covariates, the effect is insignificant for 
both mothers and fathers. For mothers, the effect is also smaller than for the target 
group. This also gives an expectation that the estimates in the DDD estimation will be 
smaller for mothers than they are in this estimation. However, for fathers, the point es-
timate is bigger and significant in the full model with additional covariates when esti-
mated for parents with older youngest children. This is in line with the figures depicting 
22  IFAU – Does providing childcare to unemployed affect unemployment duration? the proportion of fathers leaving unemployment in a specific month, where the effect 
seemed larger for fathers in the non-target group (see Figure 3 and Figure 4 ). 
Estimation results and standard errors are shown in Table 13 for the target group and in 
Table 14 for the placebo estimations in the Appendix. 
In this first DD estimation parents living in municipalities offering childcare to un-
employed parents for a limited number of months before the reform are also included. 
This means that the estimates are determined also by parents losing their childcare 
placement. The effect may be asymmetric between getting and loosing childcare and I 
have therefore also done estimations without the municipalities offering childcare a li-
mited number of months. This gives similar estimates for mothers but the precision de-
creases. For fathers the estimates differs more but for the target group the estimates are 
still insignificant. 
The results from the second DD estimation within treatment municipalities with par-
ents with older youngest children as the control group are shown in Table 9. As there 
were only 14 municipalities where childcare was not available before the reform, the 
sample size is much smaller. None of the estimates are significant at any sufficient 
level, but the estimates are greater than zero for mothers and smaller than zero for fa-
thers. 
Table 9 Estimation results for childcare, DD over age of youngest child 
   Mothers  Fathers 
   basic  full  basic  full 
Treatment Municipalities  0.150 0.132  -0.115  -0.097 
 (0.099)  (0.114)  (0.103)  (0.111) 
 [0.129]  [0.249]  [0.265]  [0.380] 
N  4 500  4 500  2 413  2 413 
Placebo Estimation         
Control Municipalities  0.014 0.025  0.017  0.011 
 (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.036)  (0.036) 
 [0.565]  [0.318]  [0.637]  [0.761] 
N  68 93  68 393  33 519  33 519 
Standard errors clustered on municipality in parentheses, P-values in brackets. 
 
In the placebo estimations, none of the estimates are significantly different from zero 
and all are close to zero, which indicates that the assumption for this DD is fulfilled. 
Estimation results and standard errors from these DD estimations are shown in Table 15 
for the treatment estimation and in Table 16 for the control estimation in the Appendix. 
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Estimation results from the DDD estimations are shown in Table 10 (for more results, 
see Table 12 in the Appendix.) The first and third columns show estimates from the ba-
sic DDD model with no individual or seasonal covariates. The estimates are insignifi-
cant but greater than zero for mothers and smaller than one for fathers. 
Table 10 Estimation results for childcare from the DDD estimations 
   Mothers  Fathers 
   basic  full  basic  full 
Childcare 0.097  0.158  -0.094  -0.016 
   (0.079)  (0.077)  (0.093)  (0.082) 
   [0.217] [0.039]  [0.308]  [0.841] 
N  85 161  85 161  42 350  42 350 
Standard errors clustered on municipality in parentheses, P-values in brackets. 
 
In column 2 and 4 of Table 10 (and Table 12), all covariates are included. The proba-
bility of leaving unemployment increases for both mothers and fathers compared with 
the basic model without any covariates, but it is only for mothers in the full model that 
the estimates is significantly different from zero. For mothers, the probability of leaving 
unemployment for work increases by 17 percent when childcare is available for unem-
ployed parents. 
When excluding parents living in municipalities offering childcare a limited number 
of months before the reform the precision decreases, due to the decreased variation, 
giving insignificant results, but the point estimate for mothers still gives an increased 
probability of finding work of 10 percent. 
As was expected from the first DD estimation, when target parents in other munici-
palities were the control group, the estimates were smaller for mothers in the DDD es-
timation compared with the first DD estimation. It is though surprising that the esti-
mates is still so large. What would be expected is an estimate that is approximately the 
difference between the DD for the target and the non-target groups. There could be ex-
pected to be small differences since parents with children starting pre-school class are 
censored in the DD for the target parents. In the basic estimations the differences be-
tween the DD estimations and the estimate in the DDD estimations are similar but for 
every added covariate the differences increases. In the full DDD estimation with all co-
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the DD estimations. 
5.3 Heterogeneous  effects 
For mothers, a large effect is found, but there may be heterogeneous effects; therefore, 
the sample of women is divided by level of education, number of children, age group, 
immigrant status and marital status, respectively, to see if there are heterogeneous ef-
fects over any of these dimensions
12. Estimation results and standard errors from the 
different estimations are shown in Table 11. The estimates from the DDD with all 
unemployed mothers are shown in the first row of Table 11. 
Table 11 Estimation results for childcare from DDD estimations, different subsamples 
   Mothers     
Population Basic    Full    N 
All 0.097  0.158  ** 85  161 
 (0.079)  (0.077)   
      
One child  -0.112  -0.129  27 923 
 (0.117)  (0.111)   
Two children  0.216  * 0.300  *** 40  019 
 (0.117)  (0.112)   
> 2 children  0.155  0.269  17 219 
 (0.154)  (0.134)  **  
      
Compulsory school or less  0.289*  0.347  ** 12  378 
 (0.153)  (0.144)   
High school ≤ 2 years  -0.089  -0.021  30 169 
 (0.119)  (0.117)   
High school 3 years  0.197  0.270  ** 20  937 
 (0.141)  (0.123)   
More than high school  0.290  ** 0.315  ** 21  677 
 (0.141)  (0.158)   
      
Age ≤ 30 years  0.061  0.123  21 428 
 (0.141)  (0.122)   
Age 31-35 years  0.121  0.194  27 513 
 (0.130)  (0.126)   
Age >35 years  0.054  0.133  36 220 
 (0.103)  (0.113)   
Standard errors clustered on municipality in parentheses, * p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
When the sample was divided according to number of children, no effect could be 
seen for those mothers with only one child. The estimates are less than zero but insigni-
ficant. The greatest effect seems to be for those women with two children, for whom the 
hazard ratio (when controlling for individual characteristics) indicates that the probabil-
                                                 
12 The same is done for fathers, but no heterogeneous effects are found. 
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ble. Even for mothers with more than two children, the estimate is larger than for the 
whole population, but it is only significant at any sufficient level when all additional 
covariates are included. 
When the sample is divided over education level, all groups, except for those moth-
ers with two or fewer years of high school education, have higher estimates than when 
all mothers are included. For those mothers with no more than two years of high school, 
no effect at all could be seen. The greatest effect seems to be for those mothers with 
very low education and secondly with university education. If the UI reform imple-
mented at the same time (see section 2.2) had affected the unemployed mothers, those 
mothers with the highest earlier wages, and therefore probably those with the highest 
education, should have had a lower probability of finding work than other mothers. As 
such is not the case, the effects of the UI reform are probably similar in the control 
groups and therefore captured by the estimation strategy. 
No heterogeneous effects over the mothers' age or immigrant status were found. Be-
cause most of the mothers were born in Sweden, the hazard ratio for Swedish-born 
mothers is similar to that for all mothers. Finally, married unemployed mothers seem to 
be more affected by availability of childcare than unmarried unemployed mothers. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, I have evaluated the effects of availability of childcare during unemploy-
ment on parents' probability of finding work using a reform implemented in Sweden in 
July 2001. The reform made it mandatory for Swedish municipalities to offer childcare 
to unemployed parents for at least 15 hours each week. Before the reform, the majority 
of municipalities already did this, but those that did not can be used as a treatment group 
in a difference-in-differences (DD) framework. In the DD estimations, two different 
control groups were used: parents with young children living in municipalities already 
offering childcare to unemployed parents before the reform and parents living in treat-
ment municipalities whose youngest child was older than childcare age. Both of these 
control groups were then used in a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) esti-
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dummies and their interactions, and a full model, with individual characteristics and 
seasonal effects also included, were estimated. 
In the first DD estimation, with parents in other municipalities as the control group, 
the point estimate in the full model gave an increased probability of 21 percent of find-
ing work for mothers when childcare is available, significant at the 1 percent level. Un-
fortunately, when doing placebo estimation using parents with older youngest children, 
a positive effect of 15 percent was found, but the standard error is larger, giving a p-
value of 6 percent. This indicate that there are probably other reasons than the childcare 
reform giving increased probability of finding work in the treatment municipalities. In 
the second DD estimation, with parents with older youngest children as the control 
group, the point estimate was positive but insignificant. This is probably because the 
variation is only over 14 municipalities, and therefore, the sample size decreased sub-
stantially. 
From the DD estimations, especially the first, it seems important to control for trends 
both within groups of parents and within municipalities, which is done in the DDD es-
timation. Here, the full model gives that the probability of finding work increased by 17 
percent for mothers when childcare was available, significant at the 5 percent level. 
Unfortunately the precision disappears when mothers living in municipalities only 
offering childcare a limited amount of months before the reform are removed from the 
analysis. The point estimate is still large but reduced which indicate that the effect of 
childcare availability when unemployed may be smaller than estimated with the full 
sample. 
For fathers, no effect could be found in any of the estimations. In the full DDD esti-
mation, the estimate was close to zero, but the standard error was large. 
When dividing the sample of mothers into different sub-populations, there was no ef-
fect of childcare availability for those mothers with two or fewer years of high school 
education, but large effects for both mothers with only compulsory school or less and 
mothers with a university education. The probability of finding work for mothers with 
two children increased with the availability of childcare, while no effect was found for 
mothers with only one child. 
IFAU – Does providing childcare to unemployed affect unemployment duration?  27 As was mentioned in the introduction, the expected effect is ambiguous because the 
availability of childcare may both decrease and increase the unemployment duration, 
depending on how its availability affects the parents' search intensity and reservation 
wage. For most mothers, the possibility to increase the search intensity seems to domi-
nate. It is somewhat surprising that no effect was found for fathers when such large ef-
fects were found for mothers, but this may be because the responsibility for caring for 
children still rests mainly with mothers (Statistic Sweden 2003). 
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Table 12 Estimation results from the DDD estimation 
 Mothers  Fathers 
  Basic Full Basic  Full 
Childcare 0.0971  0.158  -0.0943  -0.0164 
   (0.0787) (0.0765) (0.0925)  (0.0819) 
Z
m1 0.0382  0.0706  0.0526  0.0677 
   (0.107) (0.0958)  (0.0927)  (0.0930) 
Z
m2 -0.0663  0.0290  -0.0495  0.00651 
   (0.155) (0.0621)  (0.2039)  (0.0777) 
Z
t -0.0784  -0.112  -0.147  -0.148 
   (0.0207) (0.0250) (0.0246)  (0.0286) 
Z
a -0.0147  -0.0847  -0.0173  -0.0369 
   (0.0190) (0.0173) (0.0220)  (0.0231) 
Z
m1* Z
t 0.0823  0.0437  0.198  0.141 
   (0.0872) (0.0798) (0.0601)  (0.0602) 
Z
m2* Z
t 0.0760  0.0747  0.0856  0.0737 
   (0.0364) (0.0352) (0.0561)  (0.0493) 
Z
m1* Z
a 0.0652  0.0837  -0.0784  -0.0574 
   (0.0608) (0.0520) (0.0813)  (0.0829) 
Z
m2* Z
a 0.0274  0.0228  -0.0360  0.00270 
   (0.0288) (0.0295) (0.0880)  (0.0610) 
Z
t* Z
a 0.00547  0.00802  0.0135  0.00303 
   (0.0223)  (0.0226)  (0.0310)  (0.0314) 
Entering  month   -0.148   -0.280 
    (0.0135)   (0.0190) 
Elementary school    0.00529    0.0532 
    (0.0425)   (0.0545) 
High school ≤  2  years   0.195   0.150 
    (0.0405)   (0.0542) 
High school ≤  3  years   0.277   -0.0469 
    (0.0404)   (0.0515) 
University < 3 years    0.193    -0.166 
    (0.0436)   (0.0538) 
University ≥  3  years   0.223   -0.126 
    (0.0522)   (0.0508) 
Age   -0.0341   0.0246 
    (0.0113)   (0.0117) 
Age squared    0.000344    -0.000449 
    (0.000157)   (0.000145) 
Immigrant   -0.236   -0.460 
    (0.0224)   (0.0340) 
Disable   -1.286   -1.514 
    (0.0410)   (0.0645) 
Married   0.0096   0.00760 
    (0.0131)   (0.0145) 
Municipality  unemployment   -3.559   -0.0426 
    (1.029)   (1.2204) 
Population   -0.000604    -0.000818 
    (0.000128)   (0.000226) 
Share of children age 2–6    -9.350    -16.736 
     (3.531)   (4.308) 
N 612222.48  605305.27  373915.86  366745.31 
-2 LOG L  85161  85161  42350  42350 
Standard errors clustered on municipality in parentheses. 
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Table 13 Estimation results from the DD over municipalities, target parents 
 Mothers  Fathers 
 Basic  Full  Basic  Full 
Childcare 0.159  0.189  0.0395  0.0803 
   (0.0757)  (0.0681)  (0.0711)  (0.0622) 
Z
m1 0.175  0.181  0.138  0.13446 
   (0.0937) (0.0742)  (0.0778)  (0.0804) 
Z
m2 0.00205  0.0911  -0.0345  0.0576 
   (0.153) (0.0533)  (0.258)  (0.0921) 
Z
t -0.0621  -0.0937  -0.121  -0.136 
   (0.0216)  (0.0223)  (0.0248)  (0.0296) 
Entering month    -0.139    -0.273 
     (0.0201)    (0.0229) 
Elementary school    -0.0801    0.138 
     (0.0621)    (0.0854) 
High school ≤2 years    0.162    0.239 
     (0.0579)    (0.0866) 
High school ≤3 years    0.226    0.0739 
     (0.0595)    (0.0847) 
University < 3 years    0.177    -0.0744 
     (0.0592)    (0.0878) 
University ≥ 3 years    0.179    0.00948 
     (0.0697)    (0.0698) 
Age   -0.0507    0.0308 
     (0.0160)    (0.0159) 
Age squared    0.000542    -0.000568 
     (0.000237)    (0.000215) 
Immigrant   -0.259    -0.457 
     (0.0266)    (0.0374) 
Disable   -1.204    -1.512 
     (0.0553)    (0.0963) 
Married   -0.0190    -0.0140 
     (0.0176)    (0.0200) 
Municipality unemployment    -4.081    -0.575 
     (1.029)    (1.374) 
Population   -0.000614    -0.000786 
     (0.000119)    (0.000222) 
Share of children age 2-6    -9.194    -15.916 
     (3.543)    (4.851) 
N 52594  52594  25126  25126 
-2 LOG L  344788.19  341130.87  197078.93  193358.86 
Standard errors clustered on municipality in parentheses. 
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Table 14 Estimation results from the DD over municipalities, non-target parents 
 Mothers  Fathers 
 Basic  Full  Basic  Full 
Childcare 0.0834  0.143  0.121  0.156 
   (0.0835)  (0.0760)  (0.0899)  (0.0716) 
Z
m1 0.131  0.184  0.224  0.221 
   (0.104) (0.0913)  (0.0875)  (0.0891) 
Z
m2 -0.0265  0.0662  0.0150  0.0629 
   (0.148) (0.0647)  (0.191)  (0.0752) 
Z
t -0.0676  -0.108  -0.127  -0.133 
   (0.0209)  (0.0249)  (0.0278)  (0.0274) 
Entering month    -0.165    -0.287 
     (0.0225)    (0.0275) 
Elementary school    0.118    -0.0270 
     (0.0651)    (0.0620) 
High school ≤ 2 years    0.234    0.0649 
     (0.0651)    (0.0612) 
High school ≤ 3 years    0.333    -0.180 
     (0.0652)    (0.0681) 
University < 3 years    0.220    -0.240 
     (0.0688)    (0.0742) 
University ≥ 3 years    0.275    -0.284 
     (0.0770)    (0.0886) 
Age   0.0568    0.0528 
     (0.0224)    (0.0233) 
Age squared    -0.000797    -0.000747 
     (0.000298)    (0.000277) 
Immigrant   -0.204    -0.457 
     (0.0303)    (0.0422) 
Disable   -1.345    -1.533 
     (0.0566)    (0.0968) 
Married   0.0537    0.0327 
     (0.0211)    (0.0251) 
Municipality unemployment    -2.868    0.630 
     (1.202)    (1.269) 
Population   -0.000562    -0.000876 
     (0.000150)    (0.000247) 
Share of children age 2-6    -9.668    -17.558 
     (4.214)    (4.871) 
N 32567  32567  17224  17224 
-2 LOG L  220359.99  217290.11  145989.93  142664.38 
Standard errors clustered on municipality in parentheses. 
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Table 15 Estimation results from the DD over age of youngest child, treatment 
municipalities. 
 Mothers  Fathers 
 Basic  Full  Basic  Full 
Childcare 0.150  0.132  -0.115  -0.0974 
 (0.0988)  (0.114)  (0.103)  (0.111) 
Z
t -0.0207  -0.0424  0.0768  0.139 
   (0.0852)  (0.0907)  (0.0572)  (0.0747) 
Z
a 0.0774  0.0152  -0.0984  -0.178 
   (0.0537)  (0.0643)  (0.0842)  (0.0718) 
Entering month    -0.212    -0.256 
     (0.0393)    (0.0595) 
Elementary school    -0.0483    0.138 
     (0.207)    (0.222) 
High school ≤ 2 years    0.398    0.248 
     (0.215)    (0.238) 
High school ≤ 3 years    0.561    0.0439 
     (0.196)    (0.208) 
University < 3 years    0.376    -0.0369 
     (0.203)    (0.289) 
University ≥ 3 years    0.504    0.303 
     (0.170)    (0.272) 
Age   -0.0663    0.0129 
     (0.0501)    (0.0351) 
Age squared    0.000946    -0.000306 
     (0.000691)    (0.000432) 
Immigrant   -0.123    -0.220 
     (0.114)    (0.0625) 
Disable   -1.259    -1.509 
     (0.125)    (0.157) 
Married   0.0708    0.0290 
     (0.0436)    (0.0566) 
Municipality unemployment    -5.187    5.883 
     (2.738)    (3.854) 
Population   -0.00553    -0.0106 
     (0.00438)    (0.00525) 
Share of children age 2-6    -0.302    -1.121 
     (13.485)    (19.155) 
N 4500  4500  2413  2413 
-2 LOG L  24050.585  23697.599  16847.527  16456.383 
Standard errors clustered on municipality in parentheses. 
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Table 16 Estimation results from the DD over age of youngest child, control 
municipalities. 
 Mothers  Fathers 
 Basic  Full  Basic  Full 
Childcare 0.0142  0.0252  0.0169  0.0110 
 (0.0247)  (0.0252)  (0.0358)  (0.0361) 
Z
t -0.0845  -0.109  -0.150  -0.140 
   (0.0211)  (0.0253)  (-0.0264)  (0.0283) 
Z
a -0.00412  -0.0698  -0.000423  -0.0335 
   (0.0220)  (0.0206)  (0.0305)  (0.0275) 
Entering month    -0.149    -0.288 
     (0.0153)    (0.0217) 
Elementary school    0.0228    0.0953 
     (0.0482)    (0.0649) 
High school ≤ 2 years    0.201    0.185 
     (0.0452)    (0.0646) 
High school ≤ 3 years    0.269    -0.0175 
     (0.0456)    (0.0604) 
University < 3 years    0.210    -0.113 
     (0.0479)    (0.0621) 
University ≥ 3 years    0.223    -0.103 
   (0.0600)    (0.0568) 
Age   -0.0446    0.0262 
     (0.0125)    (0.0143) 
Age squared    0.000479    -0.000476 
     (0.000174)    (0.000177) 
Immigrant   -0.220    -0.437 
     (0.0207)    (0.0334) 
Disable   -1.333    -1.495 
     (0.0456)    (0.0759) 
Married   0.0099    0.0128 
     (0.0148)    (0.0163) 
Municipality unemployment    -1.880    1.103 
     (1.018)    (1.317) 
Population   -0.000467    -0.000567 
     (0.000090)    (0.000115) 
Share of children age 2-6    -4.928    -12.156 
     (3.297)    (3.927) 
N 68393  68393  33519  33519 
-2 LOG L  480864.73  475029.73  288538.76  282892.52 
Standard errors clustered on municipality in parentheses. Publication series published by the Institute for Labour Market Policy 
Evaluation (IFAU)  –  latest issues 
Rapporter/Reports 
2010:1  Hägglund Pathric ”Rehabiliteringskedjans effekter på sjukskrivningstiderna” 
2010:2  Liljeberg Linus and Martin Lundin ”Jobbnätet ger jobb: effekter av intensifierade 
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domar” 
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